We develop a micro-macro simulation model for evaluating tax policies in developing countries characterized with a high informal employment. Our approach allows to analyze the effects of a reform, such as a tax policy, both at the micro level, i.e. on individual's labor supply choices (formal/informal employment, work/leisure) and at the macro level (GDP, equilibrium wages, size of the informal sector, etc.). We analyze, for the South-African case, the effects of two tax reforms, the introduction of a proportional tax system and of a lump-sum tax system, instead of the current progressive tax system. We show that both reforms allow to reduce the size of the informal sector and produce a positive effect on GDP, but they increase income inequality.
Introduction
Unlike the advanced countries, the developing countries have a large informal sector that is difficult to tax. Developing countries face difficult challenges when they attempt to establish efficient tax systems given their weak direct and indirect tax capacity. The tax revenue-GDP ratio is a good measure for direct taxation efficiency. This ratio is usually higher in developed countries than in poor countries (McLaren, 1998) . 1 South Africa is an interesting case study. The South African government has been particularly successful in collecting direct taxes -through a progressive tax system -in the form of corporate and personal income taxes. The tax represents, over the period 1997-2002, 25% of the South African GDP, the highest among middle-income countries for which the average ratio is 15%. However taxing the informal sector remains much less successful mainly because the cost of collections is too high. Thus there are still many South Africans who remain outside the tax net. According to the 2007 Labour Force Survey, 19 .5% of employed workers operate in the informal sector in South Africa. 2 In countries where the labor market is characterized by the existence of a large informal sector and where governance quality is weak, the fiscal policy plays a significant role since it affects the individual's labor supply decision and sectoral choice.
In this paper, we analyze the discrete choice of individuals who decide whether not to work, to work in the formal sector or to work in the informal sector. We assume that workers compare the costs and benefits and choose the option that maximizes their utility given their preferences and job characteristics. Importantly here the informal employment choice is endogenous. More particularly, taxes affect the choice of individuals on the labor market (Johnson et al., 1998; Fugazza and Jacques, 2003) and, by consequence, the size of the informal sector in the economy. Informality was traditionally viewed as an unproductive and low-paid activity sector, an option for workers who cannot find a formal job. But recent economic analysis suggests that informal employment is voluntary. Maloney (1999) considers that workers are self-selected into the informal sector because of the various benefits and opportunities that it can offer or because the comparative advantage they have in the informal sector. Subject to job availability, workers choose the sector of activity that maximizes their utility. Obviously wages and job security are 1 For instance, this ratio is equal to 37.9% for OECD countries and 18.2% for developing countries over the period [1995] [1996] [1997] (Tanzi and Zee, 2000) . Tanzi (1987) focuses on the high reliance of low-income countries on indirect taxation (61% of total tax revenue on average) while indirect taxation represents 36.4% of total tax revenue in high-income countries.
2 At the enterprize level, several studies consider that the high entry costs into the formal economy explain the presence of a large informal sector in developing countries. Djankov et al. (2002) report that becoming formal in South Africa requires the completion of 7 procedures that take 30 business days, the cost of which represents 36.7% of the 1997 GDP per capita.
important determinants of the utility. However there are non-monetary advantages, like autonomy, flexibility, distance to work and working hours, which affect utility, determine job satisfaction and make desirable the informal employment. 3 Thus, depending on their characteristics, some workers choose the informal sector (Günther and Launov, 2006) . In fact, the important distinction between the formal and the informal sector is due to tax payment, where the informal sector is the tax free option. Informality has a direct impact on public revenues and expenditures, thus it accounts for fiscal policy analysis. In the literature, several studies attempt to analyze the link between the informal sector and taxation. According to Gutmann (1977) , higher taxes increase the size of the informal economy. 4 Using a simple AK-type endogenous growth model, Loayza (1996) shows that the informal sector arises when governments with weak enforcement capacity/technology impose excessive taxes and regulations. As the AK framework does not generate the transitional dynamics of the informal sector perceived in actual economies, Ihrig and Moe (2004) propose a simple dynamic model consistent with the empirical observation. The model captures the negative and convex relationship between the size of the informal sector and the real GDP per capita. Moreover, the study shows that a reduction in tax rates plays a significant role in attracting people out of the informal sector and thus improves the standard of living in the economy. The authors show for Sri Lanka that simply raising the tax rate from 9.3% to 10%, holding enforcement constant, generates more than a 2.3% increase in the informal labor in steady state. 5 Larger changes in the tax rate have even greater effects on steady state levels of the informal sector. Saracoglu (2008) proposes a dynamic general equilibrium model with heterogeneous goods and an endogenous price for the informal sector good. The model shows that the informal sector diminishes over time as the economy grows and, more importantly, a lower tax on employment in the formal sector reduces the size of the informal sector. Kugler and Kugler (2009) analyze the large increase in payroll taxes that followed the social security reform in Colombia in 1993 in order to measure the impact of these taxes on employment and wages. They show that a 10% increase in payroll taxes reduces formal employment by between 4% and 5%. 6 Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) and microsimulation models are widely used in policy analysis, and combining both types allows to profit from their respective advantages. 7 Accordingly, we use in this paper the micro-macro simulation approach developed by Magnani and Mercenier (2009) to analyze the impact of fiscal policies on the labor supply in poor countries. This approach uses the exact aggregation theory of Anderson, de Palma and Thisse (AdPT, 1992) and allows the researcher to avoid the complexity we find in alternative micro-macro simulation approaches. The theoretical aggregation's result by AdPT (1992) shows that individuals, who make a choice among discrete alternatives, are aggregated in a representative individual with CES preferences. We assume that individuals face a discrete choice problem and have to choose between not working, working in the formal sector or working in the informal sector. The exact aggregation procedure allows one to aggregate individual optimal decisions into explicit labor supply functions that we introduce in a CGE model. The CGE model is used to simulate the impact of different fiscal policies and, in particular, determines the macroeconomic effects of theses policies on equilibrium wages. These results are then introduced in the microsimulation model in order to evaluate the individual behavior on the labor market and the effects on the income distribution and poverty.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we specify the individual discrete choice problem and present the micro analysis results. The multisectoral CGE model used in this paper is presented in Section 3. Section 4 constitutes a short description of the South African tax system. In Section 5, we analyze the micro and macro effects of tax reforms on the labor market participation and the formal/informal employment decisions.
Concluding remarks are given in Section 6.
6 For high-income countries, Davis and Henrekson (2004) show that there is a positive relation between tax rates and the informal economy. Kuehn (2010) find that higher fines, lower tax rates and stronger enforcement reduce informality. Lemieux et al. (1994) assume that increases in the tax rate drive people to reallocate labor from the formal to the informal sector. Using a data set collected in Québec City in Canada, they found that this relation is significant for particular groups of the population such as socialwelfare claimants. Fugazza and Jacques (2004) show that lower workers taxation stimulate participation in the formal sector. 7 On the one hand, CGE models are subject to criticisms regarding their inherent assumption that the representative agent perfectly incorporates the optimal behavior of all individuals. On the other hand, microsimulation models are carried out on a large sample of economic agents and allow taking into account the heterogeneity present in the micro-data. However, it is subject to important disapproval due to the lack of consideration of the GE effects. An integration between the macro GE models and the microsimulation models seems fundamental to avoid the weakness of these methodologies.
2 The Individual Discrete Choice Problem
Model Specification
In this paper we estimate a discrete choice labor supply model in wich individuals are assumed to choose among three options of economic activity: (1) to work in the formal wage sector, (2) to work in the informal wage sector, and (3) not to work. We specify a nested logit model (McFadden, 1981) with two nests B k where k ∈ {L, l} denotes the leisure (L) and the labor (l) status. We assume that choices depend on annual wages, and we use the Lee's (1983) generalized selectivity model to correct for sample selection bias. 8 The decision concerning labor market status is based on utility comparisons. Individual preferences are described by the following utility function:
where h indexes individuals and j ∈ {1, 2, 3} indexes, respectively, formal/informal employment activity and not to work. V hk represents the upper nest specific component, U hj the alternative specific component, and hj the error term that is assumed to follow a generalized extreme value (GEV) distribution.
For each alternative j, the alternative specific component of u hj is defined as follows:
= 0 j = 3 where W hj represents the net annual wage of individual h from alternative j = 1, 2, and y hj is a vector of characteristics of individuals and formal/informal employment options.
The upper nest specific component is defined as follows:
The micro data give information on wages earned by individuals who are employedin the formal sector or the informal sector -and obviously we do not have any information concerning non-working individuals. Moreover, since a worker is perceived in one option (employment sector) we observe at most one wage for each person. Thus we have to im-8 Lee (1983) proposes a consistent two-step procedure based on the conditional logit model. His approach is a generalization of the two-step selection bias correction method introduced by Heckman (1979) and an extension to the case where selectivity is modelled as a multinomial logit. Since it is likely that there will be unobserved similarities among subsets, a generalization of the Lee's approach to a less restrictive nested logit is appropriate (Falaris, 1987; Vijverberg, 1995) . pute the unobserved wages for all non-chosen options. More precisely, we estimate wage equations for workers in the formal and the informal sectors. Then, using the estimated wage equations, predicted wages for each person in each employment sector can be obtained. The number of wage equations is equal to the number of options for those who choose a salaried job. The wage equation can be represented as follows:
where w hj is the net hourly wage determined by observable personal and job characteristics
x hj and a zero-mean normally distributed error term u hj . Equation (4) is a censored regression as we observe w hj only if individual h is employed in the formal or the informal sector, i.e., if k = l. In the case where u hj is correlated with hj , it is necessary to correct for the selection bias.
We estimate the wage equation and use the Lee's (1983) method to correct for selection bias -selection being specified as a nested logit. To do this, we first estimate the nested model without considering the wage as an explanatory variable. Then, we compute the probability of choosing alternative j in nest B l and we compute for each individual the value of the sample selection correction variables
. Next, we write the conditional mean of the wage equation as follows (Lee, 1983):
where Φ −1 represents the inverse of the standard normal distribution and φ is the standard normal pdf. We estimate Equation (5) separately for formal and informal salaried workers.
We note that negative values of the coefficients of the selection correction variables imply positive selectivity, i.e., persons who choose to work in a sector obtain -ceteris paribusa higher wage than the average of total population. Once we get the parameter estimates of the wage equations, we can impute wages for each individual in the non-chosen options.
More precisely, for workers in the formal (informal) sector we calculate a predicted wage in the informal (formal) sector, and for those persons who do not work, we compute potential wages in both the formal and the informal sectors.
In the final step, we reestimate Equation (1) including the individual annual wageobserved for the chosen option and imputed for non-chosen options.
We denote by P hj the probability of choosing alternative j in nest B l . Since P hj = P hj|B l .P hB l , after McFadden we can write, respectively, the probability of choosing alternative j (formal/informal sector employment) given that an alternative in nest B l is chosen, and the marginal probability of choosing one alternative in nest B l :
hj · exp (
where
is the Inclusive Value (IV) of nest B l , i.e., the quantity that links the upper and the lower models. This IV enters in the upper model (Level 1 ) as an explanatory variable. The parameter λ is a measure of the degree of independence in unobserved utility among the alternatives in nest B l . Note that a higher value of λ means greater independence and less correlation, and λ = 1 means a complete independence within the nest and a correlation absence. Moreover, λI hl represents the expected utility that individual i receives from choosing to work, i.e., nest B l .
Data and Descriptive Statistics
We apply the theoretical framework presented above and make use of the modeling strategy The 2000 LFS includes a population base of 105,371 on a sample of 26,648 households. Since we are interested in the outcome associated to employment status (formal and informal), an important information required from our data is that concerning re-muneration. All persons in paid employment are explicitly asked for the salary amount in their main job in the week preceding the survey. More precisely, the survey provides a worker's weekly, monthly or annual income and hours worked in the previous week in their main activity. These information allow us to compute hourly wage rates. 9 Another important information needed for our study is that associated to the distinction between formal and informal employment. The LFS asks workers explicitly whether their main job is in the formal or the informal sector. We use this subjective information to define the informal employment dummy. Moreover, the survey gives further information related to the employment status that allow us to better identify the activity sector of workers.
Among these information and besides the worker's answer, we control for whether the worker has a written contract, the company where he/she works is registered or not, and deduces unemployment contributions for him/her. However, only earnings from the formal sector are considered as being taxable. Income tax is computed on the individual level by applying the official tax rates for the year 2000 from the South African Revenue Service (SARS). The tax system is progressive and tax rates range from 18% to 42%. We reduce our sample to paid non self-employed workers aged 16-64 if males and 16-60 if females.
After controlling for missing values, we remain with a total of 47,977 observations. Basic summary statistics show that 30.7% of men and 21.5% of women are engaged in a salaried activity. In the selected sample, 80% are Black and 56% of people live in urban area. The average number of hours worked per week in main job is 46.8 hours. In the subsample of working people, 33.9% of women have an informal activity while only 13.3% of men are informally employed. As shown in Table 1 , the log hourly net wage is on average higher in the formal than the informal sector, and men are more likely to be paid a higher wage than women. For each individual we compute wages in the outside options, i.e., in both the formal and the informal salaried job.
Estimation Results
First, in order to analyze the individual's labor supply choice, we estimate a nested logit model with selectivity. We assume that individuals choose first whether to work on a fulltime basis or not. Then conditional on participation, they choose between the informal sector and the formal sector employment. The estimates are obtained in two stages and reported in Table 2 . The parameter estimates of the formal-informal employment choice show that men are more likely to have a formal job than women. Moreover the probability to get a job in the formal sector increases with age and education level. Blacks are less likely to obtain an employment in the formal sector and speaking English increases the likelihood to obtain a formal job. Importantly, if the household is owner of the dwelling then the worker is less likely to work and more likely to choose the informal sector. Moreover, being the head of the household affects positively the labor decision and negatively the formal employment choice. The proportion of workers living and working in the informal sector on the total number of workers in each household affects negatively formal employment choice.
Similarly, the number of workers per household -others than the person himself/herself -has a positive impact on the individual labor decision. Concerning the work-leisure decision, the existence of at least one person receiving pension benefits affects negatively the participation decision.
In the next step, we estimate the wage equations for the two sectors using OLS with correction for the selection bias. Table 3 gives the estimation results. The dependent variable is the logarithm of the net hourly wage in the formal and the informal sector, respectively. The results are qualitatively similar for both regressions. In fact, wages increase with age and education. Moreover, men have on average higher wages than women and White people more than Black ones. Concerning the Lee's variable, the estimates give a negative parameter that means there exists a positive selectivity.
Given the estimates of the wage equations, we impute hourly net wages in non-chosen options. Then, we compute annual net wages for all individuals in both the formal (W 1 ) and informal (W 2 ) sectors, and we re-estimate the formal-informal employment decision taking into account the individual formal-informal relative wage. 10 In a final step, with respect to the nested specification, we estimate the leisure-work decision. Results are presented in Table 4 . The main result of the estimates is that the relative wage (W 1 /W 2 ) affects positively participation in the formal salaried sector. In other words, wages are significant determinants of sectoral choice in that the probability to choose a formal job increases (decreases) if wages in the formal (informal) sector increase. Moreover, men and more educated people are more likely to choose the formal employment sector. However, once we control for wages, the age dummy for those who are 40 years and more has a negative and significant parameter. The notable result in the second column of Table 4 is the parameter estimate of the inclusive value. This parameter is positive and significantly different from unity which is evidence that the nested model is a realistic way to present the labor market status analyzed in this paper.
The representative agent formulation
The population is partitioned into s = 1, ..., S cells according to some characteristics such as the sex, race, age category, education, and area of residence. In what follows, we model the decision process of individuals belonging to any of these cells. For each cell, we assume there is a large enough set N s of statistically identical and independent individuals in each sub-population cell. This implies that all individuals belonging to the same cell have the same probability to choose option j ∈ {1, 2, 3}. We assume that total time endowment is the same for all persons and equals one.
The aggregate labor supplied by all individuals belonging to cell s for each option j
where W sj represents the average within-cell annual wage for option j.
Equation 8 is the aggregate labor supply in each employment sector (j = 1, 2) for given wages W sj . Thus, we can introduce these labor supply functions in the CGE model since they aggregate the preferences of individuals belonging to the same cell. 11 .
The CGE model
The macro model used in our analysis is a static and multisectoral CGE model based on the South-African input-output data-set of 2000 provided by the OECD. The input-output table, which includes 48 industries, is aggregated into 10 industries reported in Table 1 in the Appendix. 12 The construction of the SAM (Social Accounting Matrix ), necessary to calibrate our CGE model, is completed with data from national accounts concerning the balance of payments and the government account.
Production side
Each industry i = 1, ..., 10 produces two different types of good: a formal (j = 1) and an informal good (j = 2). We denote by Y i1 the production level of the formal good in industry i. It depends on the total quantity of intermediate goods
and formal capital K i1 . In contrast, the production level Y i2 of the informal good depends on the quantity of informal labor L i2 and informal capital K i2 . 13 We use a CES function as follows:
Each industry i produces the quantity of formal and informal goods by choosing the optimal level of the production factors that maximizes its profit given a technological constraint. The first order conditions for industry i producing the formal good are:
and, for industry i producing the informal good are:
12 The aggregation of industries is done with respect to the ten industries we have in the micro dataset. 13 Given the lack of data, we suppose that informal goods are produced without using intermediate inputs.
P Y ij is the equilibrium price of the formal or informal good produced by industry i, w j is the equilibrium wage per unit of effective labor for sector j = 1, 2, and r + δ is the equilibrium gross remuneration rate of a unit of capital. The parameter τ Y i represents the tax rate on the production of the formal good, and P Z i represents the aggregate price of the intermediate goods used by industry i in the formal sector. Capital is supposed to be perfectly mobile across sectors and industries, while formal and informal labor are assumed to be perfectly mobile across industries. These assumptions imply that there exists an equilibrium wage for the formal labor, an equilibrium wage for the informal labor and a unique equilibrium rate of remuneration of capital.
Given the total quantity of the intermediate good Z i , each industry i (producing formal goods) chooses the optimal quantity to buy from industry i . The first order conditions allowing to minimize the total cost are:
where P C i1 is the average purchase price of the formal good in industry i (see subsection 3.5).
The representative agent
In our model individuals are grouped according to the age class (two classes: people aged less than 40 and people aged 40 and more), sex, education (two classes: high and low skilled), race (two classes: Black or non-Black), and area of residence (two classes: urban and rural). Thus, we consider s = 1, ..., 32 cells.
Each cell earns a net labor income W sj = (1−τ sj )· w j ·A sj , where w j is the (equilibrium) wage per unit of effective labor in sector j = 1, 2, τ is the average tax rate defined later (with τ sj = 0 for j = 2, and A sj is the productivity of the cell s in sector j. 14 Each cell s supplies formal and informal labor according to the following labor supply functions: 14 (1 − τsj) wj · Asj represents the average net wage that individuals belonging to the cell s earn in sector j. The value of wj · Asj is estimated from a wage equation using the age class, sex, education class, race, and area of residence as explanatory variables.
where L sj is the number of individuals of cell s who work in sector j, while N s is the total number of individuals belonging to the cell s. Note that the labor supply functions aggregate the preferences of individuals belonging to each cell s. 15 σ A and σ B are elasticities that come from the estimation of the discrete-choice labor supply.
Income taxation is progressive in South-Africa. In order to take into account the progressivity of income taxation in the CGE model, we estimate, for each cell, a taxation equation, i.e. a non-linear expression that links the income tax with the income. In particular, we use the following expression:
where j = 1. Of course, the informal labor incomes are not taxed, implying tax s2 = 0.
The coefficients are estimated separately for each cell s from the micro data-set in order to minimize the sum of the squared errors and by imposing that the total taxation predicted by the estimation coincides with the observed value for each cell.
The income tax rate is then equal to:
Then, we consider one representative agent who perceives the net labor incomes (formal and informal) earned by the 32 cells. This representative agent owns an exogenous wealth W remunerated at the rate r and receives exogenous transfers Γ from the government.
The net income earned by the representative agent is given by: An exogenous fraction s rate of the net income is saved and the complementary fraction is consumed. The budget constraint is then:
where C represents the aggregate consumption and P C the consumer price index.
The choice of the quantity of good i of sector j, C ij , is made in order to maximize a CES utility function. The first order conditions are:
where P C ij is the consumer price of good i of sector j.
Government
Concerning the government, revenues are given by indirect taxes on the production of formal goods and direct taxation on labor incomes, while expenditures are given by the public consumption of goods and services, 16 interests on the public debt (B) and transfers to families Γ. The difference determines the public surplus (or deficit) S G . In particular,
we assume that the ratio between the public surplus (or deficit) and the GDP ratio is kept constant, and the total public expenditure is endogenously determined by the following budget constraint:
Investment
The aggregate investments, in a pure neoclassical model, are determined by aggregate savings, i.e. the sum of private savings, public savings, and with respect to the rest of the world:
where savings with respect to the rest of the world S Row are defined later. 16 National accounts indicate that the public consumption concerns only the industry 9 "Public administration". The public consumption of the other industries is then fixed at zero in the model.
The aggregate investment I must be the split out between different industries. The first order conditions in order to minimize the total investment cost are:
where P I is the average investment price of industry i in the formal sector.
International trade and the balance of payments
The formal production for each industry i can be sold in the domestic market or exported.
Goods that are exported are supposed to be identical to those sold in the domestic market, implying that the selling price is the same. Exports are defined by a demand function that negatively depends on the relative price i.e. the ratio between the domestic price and the foreign price expressed in domestic currency:
whereP i and ε are respectively the (exogenous) foreign price of industry i expressed in foreign currency and the (endogenous) nominal exchange rate.
The informal production, in contrast, is supposed to be sold only on the domestic market.
The total demand for each industry i of the formal good is given by i Z ii + C i1 + G i + I i . This total demand can be satisfied by domestic production or by imports. 17 We use an Armington formulation implying that domestic (X) and foreign (M ) productions are supposed to be not perfectly substitutes due to the different origin of the products.
The first order conditions in order to minimize the total cost of the demand are:
For the formal goods, the consumer price of industry i (P C i1 ) is then equal to a weighted average between the domestic price P Y i1 and the foreign priceP i · ε.
Concerning the balance of payments, the sum between the current account and the capital account must be zero. The capital account surplus S Row is fixed at the initial level and the exchange rate ε is endogenously determined to equilibrate the balance of payments:
Equilibrium conditions
We assume that the domestic prices are perfectly flexible and guarantee the equilibrium in each market, i.e. the markets of goods and services of the 10 industries, the labor market and the capital market.
Concerning the industry i, the production level of the formal good must coincide with the domestic and foreign demand, while the production level of the informal good must coincide with private consumption:
These equations determine the domestic equilibrium price for the industry i in the sector j, P Y ij .
Concerning the labor market, the total quantity of effective units of formal and informal labor demanded by firms must coincide with the quantity supplied by individuals:
These equations determine the domestic equilibrium wage (per unit of effective labor)
in the formal and informal sectors, w 1 and w 2 .
Concerning the capital market, the (exogenous) total quantity of capital supplied by individuals W must finance the total formal and informal capital demanded by firms and the public debt B:
This equation determines the domestic equilibrium rate of remuneration of capital.
Finally, the numéraire chosen is the domestic producer price index computed as the weighted average of the domestic prices of industry i and sector j.
Data
The quantity of formal labor and capital used by each sector comes from the input-output data-set. 18 In order to determine the quantity of informal labor used by each sector we take into account the weight of the informality (in terms of wages) that comes from the micro data-set (see Table 2 ). The remuneration of informal capital by sector is determined by applying the same weights, i.e. by assuming that the intensity of the informality is the same for labor and capital in each sector.
Given that the GDP is computed by taking into account only the remuneration of formal factors, the fact that in our model we also include informal remunerations, we have to increase one (or more) components of the aggregate demand (i.e. private and public consumption, investment, and current account). We assume that all the informal remunerations of labor and capital are perceived by the representative agent and consumed.
The South African Tax System
For the purpose of our study, we focus our analysis on the personal income taxation in South Africa. Here we summarize its most important features. Given the year in which the sample used is collected, we apply the 2000/2001 tax rates. 19 The income tax consists of 6 brackets ranging from a rate of 18% applied to incomes less than or equal to R35,000
to 42% for incomes above R200,000 (Table A. The South African tax system is progressive, and the taxable unit is not the family, but the individual. In other words, the individual income tax rate structure is applicable 18 Concerning the sector 10 "Private households", no information are available about the labor and capital remuneration in the input-output data-set. We determine the factors' remunerations by taking into account that from the micro data-set the labor remuneration in sector 10 represents 0.56% of the total formal labor remuneration. 19 The South African fiscal year goes from the first of March to the end of February.
to all persons irrespective of marital status. 20 However, this method implies that in the presence of a progressive tax system, a fiscal discrimination remains between a one income earner family and a family with two members earning together the same taxable income.
Obviously, because of the tax progressivity, this discrimination increases with the total income of the family. The South African tax legislation aims to reduce the tax gap and increase tax collections. The child rebate was removed to reduce fraud, but the primary rebate continues to increase on an annual basis. The majority of registered individual taxpayers are men given that participation of men is higher than that of women and men are more likely to have a formal employment activity. In 2000/2001, the personal income tax accounts for R86,478 million (9.1% of GDP) and represents 39.2% of total tax revenue.
Tax Reforms: Macro and Micro Effects
In this section we analyze the effects of two tax reforms: in the first, noted Reform 1, the progressive tax system is replaced by a proportional tax system; in the second, noted
Reform 2, it is replaced by a lump-sum tax system. In the first case, only workers in the formal sector pay taxes according to a rate equal to 12% computed in a way that guarantees that the total amount of taxes remains unchanged. In the second case, all individuals, independently on the labor choice and the income earned, pay the same amount of taxes (485 Rand) that is computed in a way that guarantees that the total amount of taxes
remains unchanged.
We first analyze the macroeconomic and then the effects at the individual level.
Macroeconomic Effects on the Whole Economy
Tax policies produce important effects in the labor market and, consequently, in the whole economy. First, tax policies produce changes in the labor supply since they modify the opportunity-cost of working and of choosing the employment sector. Second, a general equilibrium effect on wages is produced. In fact, the change in the labor supply may be absorbed by the demand of firms only via the adjustment in wages. 20 The earlier South African income tax system sustains the belief that households with two income earners are better off than households with one income earner, assuming that altruism prevails within the household. Thus, the second earner (i.e., the wife) was taxed more heavily. In 1994, the Katz Commission was charged to evaluate the appropriateness of the tax system and make some recommendations to improve it. The main purpose of this commission was to establish equity between men and women. Following the recommendations of the Katz Commission, the South African government introduced several tax policy changes since 1994 among which the introduction of a unified structure for income tax rate for all individuals, the adjustments of the tax rates and income brackets, and the reduction of the number of income brackets.
Labor choices, both at the individual level and at the macro level, depend on the yearly net (of direct taxes) wage. In particular, the amount of direct taxes is modified with Reform 1 which considers a proportional tax system implying that poor cells pay on the basis of a greater tax rate while rich cells pay on the basis of a lower tax rate.
However, the amount of direct taxes becomes zero with Reform 2. Concerning choices at the national level, the fraction of people who choose to work in the formal sector increases in both scenarios from 77.3% to 78.2% and 78.0%, respectively with Reform 1 and 2. The fraction of people who choose to work decreases with Reform 1 from 25.7% to 25.1%, while it increases with Reform 2 to 26.1%. The same results are obtained at the microeconomic level. Table 5 shows the main macroeconomic results. The number of workers in the formal sector decreases with Reform 1 by 1.1% and increases with Reform 2 by 2.8%; the number of workers in the informal sector decreases in both scenarios respectively by 6.3% and 1.4%.
The total number of workers decreases by 2.3% with Reform 1 and increases by 1.8% with Reform 2. However, the labor supply depends not only on the number of workers but also on their productivity. The number of units of effective labor in the formal sector increases by 0.7% with Reform 1 and by 4.5% with Reform 2, while it decreases in the informal sector by 7.8% with Reform 1 and by 3% with Reform 2. These effects represent the change in the labor supply at the macroeconomic level.
Wages, in the formal and informal sectors, adjust in order to guarantee the equilibrium in the labor markets. In particular, the equilibrium wage in the formal sector decreases in both scenarios, respectively by 0.4% and 1.6%, while the equilibrium wage in the informal sector increases in both scenarios, respectively by 2.5% and 1.9%.
The change in the labor demand affects the demand of capital which decreases in the formal sector and increases in the informal sector. Importantly, the level of production at the national level in the formal sector, which represents the real GDP, increases with both reforms (by 0.2% with Reform 1 and by 2.2% with Reform 2 ) while the production in the informal sector decreases (-1.2% and -0.3% with Reform 2 ). Total production remains essentially unchanged with Reform 1 and increases by 2% with Reform 2. Thus, the introduction of a lump-sum tax, implying that no distortions are produced in the labor market, induces a positive macroeconomic effect on real GDP and total (formal and informal) production.
The size of the informal sector is measured in terms of production, number of workers and of units of effective labor. Table 6 shows that in all these cases, the tax reforms provoke a (small) reduction in the size of the informal sector, especially with the Reform 1. In terms of production, the size of the informal sector decreases from 8.1% to 7.9% with both tax reforms, while, in terms of number of workers, the size of the informal sector decreases from 22.7% to 21.8% with Reform 1 and to 22% with Reform 2.
In Table A .5, we show the detailed effects at the industry level, in the formal and informal sectors, concerning the production, the labor and capital demand.
Microeconomic Effects
We estimate the micro effects of different tax reforms on discrete labor supply choices.
As shown in Table 7 , we study the effect of replacing the actual 2000 income tax with a proportional tax equivalent to 12% (Reform 1 ) and a lump-sum tax (Reform 2 ) for the different cells. 21 We want to emphasize that general equilibrium effects related to simulated tax changes are considered. 22 We present in Table 7 the effects on the formal/informal employment and the work/leisure choices respectively, subsequent to tax reforms we simulate. The effect of the proportional tax on the total sample study is an decrease in the participation decision and an increase in the formal employment choice. The lump-sum tax increases the net wage in the formal sector with respect to the informal sector, thus we observe an increase in both the participation decision and the formal employment.
The main observation to make from Table 7 is that a proportional tax tends to reduce labor market participation of those categories who are poor or less productive. In fact, we observe a decrease in the decision to work for females, low-educated persons, Blacks and persons living in rural areas. The reason of these changes is that those people who are less productive face a higher taxation with Reform 1 (12% vs. very low tax rates in the actual South African income taxation) and thus adjust their choices by reducing their participation. On the contrary, for males, non-Blacks and more-educated persons the effect of Reform 1 is an increase in their labor market participation. Concerning the lump-sum tax (Reform 2 ), the direct taxation becomes nil. Thus individuals are induced to participate more, except in those cells where the income level is very low, i.e., females, low-educated and Blacks, implying that the elimination of the direct taxation has no effect on net labor incomes.
Concerning the formal/informal employment decision, the increase in the share of the formal employment is expected to be greater with Reform 2 than Reform 1. This is not the case since the sector choice is conditional to the decision to participate. For those who were initially and still employed, the probability to choose a formal job increases. The main concern is that of people who modify their participation decision. In particular, those 21 For more detailed results across cells, see Table A.6 . 22 The results presented do not concern self-employed workers who could fit in the category of taxpayers.
who loose their jobs are those who are more likely to have an informal job before the tax reform. Similarly, workers who increase their participation subsequently to tax reforms have a higher probability to choose an informal job. For low-productive individuals, given that they reduce their participation with Reform 1, but not with Reform 2, we observe a reduction in the informal employment implying that the proportion of formal employment increases more with Reform 1.
The analysis in terms of inequality concerns the household annual net wages while taking into consideration equivalence scales. In Table 8 , we present the Gini index and the Theil index for the total sample as well as for the different cells in the initial case and after the tax reforms. We notice an overall increase of inequality with the proportional tax and the lump-sum tax. This increase in inequality is observed for all the cells.
Conclusion
In this paper, we present a micro-macro simulation approach to analyze the impact of different tax policies on the labor supply in developing countries characterized by a high level informality and a low level of participation. Our micro-macro model is built using the approach developed by Magnani and Mercenier (2009) We analyze, for the South-African case, the discrete choice problem of individuals who have to decide whether not to work, to work in the formal sector or to work in the informal sector, and how tax policies affect these choices. In particular, we analyzed two types of tax reform. The first in which the current progressive tax system is replaced by a proportional tax system; the second in which the it is replaced by a lump-sum tax system.
We quantify the effects of these reforms at the individual level, i.e. on the labor market choice of each individual, and at the macro level. The main results are that both reforms produce a positive effect at the macroeconomic level in terms of GDP and total production, i.e. including informal activities, and in terms of reduction of the size of the informal sector, but a negative effect in terms of income inequality. (i) The second and third columns give estimates of the binary choice models with the formal employment dummy and the work dummy as dependent variables, respectively; (ii) Standard errors are in parentheses; (iii) The "household informal workers" variable indicates the proportion of informal workers among employed persons within the household. (i) The second and third columns give estimates of the binary choice models with the formal employment dummy and the work dummy as dependent variables, respectively; (ii) Standard errors are in parentheses; (iii) Age dummy equals one for those people aged 40 and more; (iv) The education dummy indicates whether people are high educated (secondary education and more). ---------------------------- R6 300 + 26% of the amount above R35 000 5.99% R45 001 -R60 000 R8 900 + 32% of the amount above R45 000 6.30% R60 001 -R70 000 R13 700 + 37% of the amount above R60 000 2.00% R70 001 -R200 000 R17 400 + 40% of the amount above R70 000 6.47% R200 001 -and above R69 400 + 42% of the amount above R200 000 0.71% Individual Primary Rebates R3 800 Tax Threshold under 65 years R21 111
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